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INTRODUCTION 
 
Thank you very much to the University of New Brunswick’s Faculty of Law for the 
invitation to deliver this lecture, and for the warm hospitality I received. I am 
honoured to deliver this lecture named in memory of Ivan C Rand. I know Justice 
Rand had a varied and brilliant legal career, having been an Attorney General, a 
Supreme Court judge, and dean of law. For these reasons I hope he would have 
sympathized with the enterprise I embark on this evening. That enterprise is to reflect 
on the disconnect between the way securities law is taught in Canadian law schools 
and the evolving practice of securities regulation itself. I have taught securities law at 
Osgoode Hall Law School for 15 years and recently became a practising regulator. I 
find it puzzling that what I teach as part of the core securities curriculum bears 
relatively little relationship to the questions preoccupying regulators in real time. 
Throughout this talk I want to explore the nature of this disconnect and how we 
might begin to correct it.  
 
 
I acknowledge that this existential puzzle might be of limited interest to a 
law school audience. I will therefore try to broaden the significance of this perceived 
disconnect by analyzing the approach to securities regulation taken in the recent 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision Securities Reference1, released in 
December 2011. In this decision, the SCC commented on the content of Canadian 
securities law while considering the constitutionality of Parliament’s draft securities 
act. At paragraph 41, the Court indicates that securities law encompasses the 
following topics: “[P]rospectus review and clearance; oversight of disclosure 
requirements; takeover bids and insider trading; registration and regulation of market 
intermediaries; enforcement of compliance with the regime; recognition and 
supervision of exchanges and other self-regulated organizations; and public 
education.” This list of topics comprises the core curriculum of most securities law 
courses taught at Canadian law schools. In addition, when the SCC applied the 
* The views expressed in these remarks are personal and do not reflect the views of any regulatory body. 
These remarks have not been substantively updated since they were delivered on February 21, 2013 
** Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University and Vice-Chair, Ontario Securities 
Commission.  
1 Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837 [Securities Reference]. 
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General Motors2 factors to the draft securities act it made a number of references to 
the “day-to-day regulation of securities”3 and to the “basic nature of securities 
regulation which, as shown, remains primarily focused on local concerns of 
protecting investors and ensuring the fairness of markets through regulation of 
participants.”4 
 
 
I hasten to assure you that I am not wading into the issue of whether 
securities regulation should be structurally organized around provincial or national 
lines. Many views have been expressed on this issue, both before and after the 
Securities Reference. Rather I want to argue that the framework for communicating 
and teaching securities law in Canada – as represented by the SCC in the quotes 
above – has not taken sufficient account of broad structural changes in the 
organization of the capital markets in Canada and elsewhere. This means that it 
provides an inadequate description and analysis of the legal and institutional 
questions being confronted by regulators today.  
 
 
In particular, the pedagogical framework remains largely driven by the 
concerns of issuers and focuses on the needs of those issuers to raise capital. This 
emphasis may well be largely the product of history. For example, in Ontario the first 
comprehensive piece of securities legislation was enacted in 1945 following the 
recommendations of a Royal Commission on Mining. This Commission was created 
to consider how the mining industry could be enhanced in the province.5  
 
 
The Canadian academic literature and the pedagogical approach do not, by 
and large, take an investor-centric approach to the analysis of securities regulation. I 
say this despite the fact that the SCC refers to the importance of investor protection 
in its decision and that investor protection is enumerated as a goal of all provincial 
securities statutes. Throughout this talk I consider whether – and to what extent – the 
emerging realities of 21st century capital markets and securities law could be better 
addressed if we really took an investor perspective seriously in our scholarship and 
teaching. I will address this by providing four examples of contemporary challenges 
in Canadian capital markets that are not captured by the traditional law school 
curriculum or the account of securities law provided by the SCC. They are: (i) the 
organization of financial services in Canada, (ii) the proliferation of financial 
products, (iii) the regulation of trading in the secondary markets, and (iv) the 
enforcement mechanisms to deal with securities law breaches. 
 
2 General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing, [1989] 1 SCR 641. 
3 Supra note 1 at paras 116, 117. 
4 Ibid at para 128 [emphasis added]. 
5 Mary Condon, Making Disclosure: Ideas and Interests in Ontario Securities Regulation (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1998) ch 2. 
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THE ORGANIZATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES IN CANADA 
 
In the typical law school curriculum we pay little attention to financial services 
providers. These parties perform an intermediary role in financial markets and may 
be registered by securities regulators. There are almost 1,500 registered firms and 
120,000 individuals who act in various intermediary capacities in our securities 
markets.6 That number of financial services firms is about half the number of issuers 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange.7 These numbers suggest the growing importance of 
the financial services sector in the Canadian economy. 
 
 
In order to analyse the effectiveness of how financial services firms deal 
with investors and the adequacy of the legal framework, the first problem to be 
overcome is the confusing myriad of financial services provider titles. There are 
brokers, investment bankers, investment dealers, investment advisers, mutual fund 
dealers, prime brokers, scholarship plan dealers, financial planners, financial 
advisors, portfolio managers, and exempt market dealers. Some of these titles refer to 
categories of registration under securities law in various provinces, some do not. 
Some refer to individuals and some to firms. Sometimes, the name of the category 
provides a clue as to the limitations of the services that can be sold (e.g., mutual fund 
dealer). However, in other cases it does not (e.g., financial advisor). Even within the 
mutual fund dealer category, there is yet another distinction between those dealers 
who sell all brands of mutual funds and those who only sell the brands 
“manufactured” by their sponsoring company. It is understandable that an individual 
consumer of financial services might not appreciate these limitations and their 
implications for his or her choices among financial products. Further, investors may 
not appreciate the varying intensity of regulation as it pertains to certain categories of 
financial actors.  
 
 
 Several categories of financial service are primarily regulated by the 
provincial government regulator. Others are not. The frontline regulation of most 
investment firms is accomplished by the Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada or the Mutual Fund Dealers Association. Each of these 
organizations has promulgated its own set of rules to guide the conduct of its 
members. These rules are very detailed, wide-ranging, and significant to the 
operations of financial services firms and registered individuals, yet receive very 
little attention in the law school classroom. 
 
 
6 National Registration Database Information (14 February 2013), online: <http://www.nrd-info.ca/>. 
7 Ontario Securities Commission, 2012 OSC Annual Report, online: 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/static/_/AnnualReports/2012/pdf/08-OSC-AR2012-EN.pdf> at 23. 
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The analytic question becomes whether all these financial services titles and 
registration categories are justified in a contemporary context, or whether they 
represent accretions of historical decisions that made sense at the time but no longer 
do. Another question is whether there is a more rational way to organize these 
activities given the significant threshold and access problems they create for 
investors. My point is that legal scholars, lawyers, and students do not typically raise 
these questions or challenge regulators about them.  
 
 
An issue that does preoccupy securities regulators is whether the standards 
of conduct that should be expected from some or all of these categories of 
intermediary are adequate. There is some confusion evident in the SCC’s discussion 
of financial intermediaries. In the Securities Reference the Court points out that 
“individuals engaged in the securities business are still, for the most part, exercising 
a trade or occupation within the province.”8 Thus, the draft act put forward by the 
federal government descended “well into industry-specific regulation”.9 Other 
references are made throughout the SCC decision to the “securities industry.”10 Yet, 
in other places the SCC refers to the regulation of “professional competence” and the 
role of the provinces in regulating professions.11 My purpose is not to assess whether 
it would be better for provincial or federal governments to regulate the practitioners 
of financial services. Rather, I ask whether those who provide such services are in an 
industry or practicing a profession. Does it matter? It might matter to investors. It 
likely matters to the legal analysis of the responsibilities service providers undertake 
to their clients. For example, the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute’s Global 
Market Sentiment Survey for 2013 reports that over half its members cited a lack of 
“ethical culture within financial firms as the fact that has contributed most to the low 
level of industry trust [and that] the social contract that should exist between 
financial professionals and those they serve has been damaged, if not broken”.12 
Meanwhile in various surveys of Canadian investors a critical mass believe that the 
legal relationship they have with their intermediaries already requires those 
intermediaries to act in investors’ best interests.13 
 
 
Despite the growing size of the intermediation function and its implications 
for investors, we lack both the vocabulary and securities-specific legal principles to 
8 Supra note 1 at para 117. 
9 Ibid. While it is of course true that an individual registrant may be geographically located in a specific 
place, local registrants may well be organized into national firms. 
10 See for example, ibid at paras 34, 112, 127. 
11 Ibid at para 122. 
12 Chartered Financial Analyst Institute, Global Market Sentiment Survey (2013), online: 
<www.cfainstitute.org/Survey/global_market_sentiment_survey_2013_full.pdf > at 5. 
13 See e.g., Ontario Securities Commission, Strengthen Investor Protection in Ontario – Speaking with 
Ontarians, Prepared by Ascentum Inc (31 January 2013), online: 
<www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Investors/iap_20130318_strengthening-investor-protection.pdf> at v. 
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determine an appropriate framework for the future.14 The Canadian Securities 
Administrators is currently working on this. They recently issued a discussion paper 
regarding whether – or how – a fiduciary duty should be imposed on dealers with 
respect to their investors.15  
 
 
Canadian law schools can contribute to an evidence-based discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of changing the legal regime in the manner proposed 
by regulators. Behavioural economics might assist in the analysis. This empirical 
approach pursues an understanding of how people make decisions, especially in 
contexts where they rely on others. For example, one study purports to show that 
when a financial services provider discloses a conflict of interest this leads investors 
to accept the provider’s recommendations more readily.16 The researchers interpreted 
this finding to mean that people do not want to be perceived to mistrust others’ 
advice. Dan Ariely’s work provides another example. Ariely found that people are 
more inclined to steal non-monetary things than they are to steal money.17 He 
suggests that this could be a problem in the cashless environment of financial 
services. The question for lawyers – and law students – is how best to incorporate 
these insights into a workable legal framework which will govern the relationship 
between investors and financial service providers.  
 
 
THE PROLIFERATION OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 
 
In the Securities Reference the SCC depicted securities as instruments that 
companies issue when they are seeking financing for business enterprise. Various 
paragraphs of the decision wrestle with the question of whether this should be 
provincially or a nationally regulated, but the decision does not address the variety 
and complexity of the types of financial products that investors can buy or the 
implications of that diversity for securities regulation. For instance, some $824 
billion has been channelled by Canadian investors into mutual funds.18 This product, 
by definition, interposes another set of intermediaries between the investor and a 
company seeking capital – assuming the pooled mutual fund invests in the securities 
of commercial businesses. Other investment funds increasingly invest in many and 
14 George Loewenstein, Daylian Cain & Don Moore, “When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding 
the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interests” (2010-11) 37:5 Journal of Consumer Research 
836.   
15 Ontario Securities Commission, “The Standard of Conduct for Advisers and Dealers: Exploring the 
Appropriateness of Introducing a Statutory Best Interest Duty When Advice is Provided to Retail Clients,” 
CSA Consultation Paper 33-403 (25 October 2012), online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/3738.htm>. 
16 Strengthen Investor Protection in Ontario – Speaking with Ontarians, supra note 13. 
17 Dan Ariely, The Honest Truth about Dishonesty (New York: Harper Perennial, 2012). 
18 Ontario Securities Commission, OSC Staff Notice 81-718: Summary Report for Investment Fund Issuers 
2012, online: <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_sn_20130124_81-718_summary-rpt-if-
issuers-2012.htm>.  
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varied types of assets, including commodities, mortgages, corporate debt, and real 
estate. Exchange traded funds have become another popular vehicle for investment. 
For example, in October 2012 there were 260 exchange traded funds in Canada with 
assets of approximately $54 billion.19 The law school curriculum tends not to address 
the regulation of these products despite their increasing significance to Canadians. 
 
 
The Ontario Securities Commission recently gathered data on exempt 
market activity in the province. The Commission found that 68% of the capital raised 
in Ontario in 2011 in the exempt market was raised by investment funds as opposed 
to capital-seeking companies.20 The legal framework for issuing securities in Canada 
distinguishes between capital raised in the public market and that raised in the 
exempt market and there are fewer disclosure requirements in the exempt market.  
 
 
It was recently reported in the US that, “the money retail investors have in 
alternative investments in the US, ranging from baskets of commodities to mutual 
funds that employ sophisticated trading, more than doubled from 2008 to 2012, to 
$712 billion from $312 billion.”21 At the same time, the number of initial public 
offerings has been declining in Canada since 2005.22 Finally, almost one million 
Canadians are members of defined contribution pension plans.23 Defined 
contribution pension plans typically offer a number of investment options to their 
members – usually including mutual fund investments. In other words, working 
Canadians who might have had very little direct contact with the capital markets a 
couple of decades ago are now more dependent on the financial markets for 
retirement support. This is especially true for the many millions of Canadians who 
have no formal pension plan coverage.24 
 
 
A number of pressing regulatory issues arise from this proliferation of 
products and points of contact with the financial markets. They include questions 
such as whether investors understand the risks of the novel products they are 
investing in, whether the products are too complicated for retail investors, whether 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ontario Securities Commission, Annual Report 2013, online: 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Publications/rpt_2013_osc-annual-rpt_en.pdf>. 
21 Nathaniel Popper, “Speculative Bets Prove Risky as Savers Chase Payoff”, The New York Times (10 
February 2013) online: <www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/business/wave-of-investor-fraud-extends-to-
ordinary-retirement-servers.html?_r=0>.  
22 Pricewaterhouse Coopers  “The Canadian IPO Market: Decade in Review 2000-2009.” 
23 Neil Faba, “Top 50 DC Plans Report: A Road Map for the Future” Benefits Canada (26 September 
2011) online: <http://www.benefitscanada.com/pensions/cap/top-50-dc-plans-report-a-road-map-for-the-
future-20962>. 
24 Mary Condon, “Privatizing Pension Risk: Gender, Law and Financial Markets” in B Cossman and J 
Fudge, Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 
128. 
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those selling them or the regulators themselves understand them, or whether the 
trading strategies engaged in by investment funds are appropriate. While I do not 
presume to provide the answers to these questions in this talk, it is clear that the 
markets have moved a long way from the relatively simple scenario depicted by the 
SCC of retail investors investing in shares of blue-chip Canadian companies.  
 
 
Equally, a contemporary discussion about investment products must include 
derivatives, the subject of much regulatory debate since the global financial crisis. 
Interestingly, this type of financial product warranted mention in the SCC’s decision 
as one that might legitimately attract federal regulation. But the basis for this was not 
particularly well elaborated beyond a general link made to systemic risk.25 Canadian 
derivatives trading only accounts for 2% of global derivatives trading, however there 
is wide variation in the size of the notional amounts of derivatives trading that is 
attributed to Canadian traders. These notional amounts range from just over $10 
trillion26 to $37 trillion27. The most frequent types of derivatives traded by Canadian 
financial institutions are interest rate swaps, followed by currency swaps. The Group 
of Twenty has targeted the regulation of derivatives trading as a high priority in the 
wake of the financial crisis, and domestic regulators are responding accordingly.  
 
 
There are at least two significant implications of these developments in the 
sophistication of financial products for securities regulators in Canada. One is the 
question of the adequacy of the institutional architecture of financial product 
regulation. Banks in Canada have become highly integrated organizations, trading a 
wide variety of financial products (both for themselves and on behalf of clients). Yet, 
these products are subject to different legal regimes and governing regulators 
depending on whether they are classified as banking, securities or insurance 
products. One historical example of this problem is the product known as a 
“principal protected note”. There was a vigorous debate in Canada a decade ago 
about whether the sale of this type of instrument was within “the business of 
banking” rather than subject to regulation as a security. More recently, provincial 
securities regulators have embarked on the task of developing a scheme of regulation 
for derivative products.28 Banks are the dominant players in the derivatives trading 
25 Securities Reference, supra note 1 at para 103. 
26 OTC Derivatives Working Group, Reform of Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets in Canada: 
Discussion Paper from the Canadian OTC Derivatives Working Group (26 October 2010) online: 
<http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/reform.pdf>. 
27 TMX Group, “TMX Group Inc Declares Dividend of $0.40 per Common Share” TMX Press Release (5 
April 2011) online: <http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/Q22011_TMXGroup_Dividend.pdf>. 
28 Canadian Securities Administrators, “Consultation Paper 91-401 on Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Regulation in Canada” (2 November 2010); “Consultation Paper 91-402 on Derivatives: Trade 
Repositories” (23 June 2011); “Consultation Paper 91-403 on Derivatives: Surveillance and Enforcement” 
(25 November 2011); “Consultation Paper 91-404 on Derivatives: Segregation and Portability in OTC 
Derivative Clearing” (10 February 2012); “Consultation Paper 91-405 on Derivative: End-User 
Exemption” (20 April 2012); “Consultation Paper 91-406 on Derivatives: OTC Central Counterparty 
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area in Canada. This raises the question of whether the regulatory scheme for 
derivatives trading should be administered by banking or securities regulators. From 
an investor’s perspective, the functional differentiation between securities law and 
banking law may make little sense especially if there is a possibility of regulatory 
gaps arising as a result. An example of such a gap would be the absence of a 
requirement to conduct a “suitability” analysis accompanying the sale of a 
sophisticated financial product. This is an analysis of whether the product is suitable 
for the investor in the context of their overall financial situation and risk tolerance. 
This issue recently arose in other jurisdictions with respect to, for example, the mis-
selling of interest rate swaps to small businesses in conjunction with conventional 
bank loans.29 It has not historically been part of the mandate of prudential banking 
regulators in Canada to focus on questions of the suitability of products sold to end-
user clients.  
 
 
Other countries are in the midst of experimenting with changes to financial 
regulation architecture. For example, the UK is moving to divide a previously 
integrated financial regulator – the Financial Services Authority – into several 
separate organizations, namely the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority. However, in this so-called “twin peaks” model, the Financial 
Conduct Authority will be responsible for regulating retail as well as wholesale 
financial markets irrespective of the type of product being sold to retail or 
institutional customers. Such a model was suggested for Canada during the research 
phase of the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in 2009, but has not been pursued 
publicly since then.30 
 
 
The second implication of the proliferation of complex financial products 
concerns the philosophical architecture of securities regulation. Here I am referring 
in particular to the iconic status of disclosure of information as the regulatory 
solution to all ills. Many of those who commented in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis argued that it was very difficult, even for sophisticated investors, to actually 
understand the hundreds of pages of disclosures about the assets underlying 
securitized products (e.g., collateralized debt obligations).31 Regulators are now 
required to confront the limitations of information disclosure as the default 
regulatory tool. One step that has been taken in Canada is the introduction of a 
summary document accompanying the sale of mutual fund products known as “Fund 
Facts.” This two-page document is intended to highlight only the most salient 
Clearing” (20 June 2012); “Consultation Paper 91-407 on Derivatives: Registration” (18 April 2013), 
Ontario Securities Commission, online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca>. 
29 James Hurley, “Compensation fears for mis-selling victims”, Daily Telegraph  (28 January 2013) 3. 
30 Eric Pan, “Structural Reform of Financial Regulation in Canada” (Research Study Prepared for the 
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, 2009), online: <http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-
studies/Structural%20Reform%20of%20Financial%20Regulation%20-%20Pan.English.pdf>.  
31 Mary Condon, “Canadian Securities Regulation and the Global Financial Crisis” (2010) 42:2 UBC L 
Rev 473. 
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features of a mutual fund investment. Regulators engaged in testing with members of 
the investing public to determine what information to include in this brief document. 
The question that flows from this example is whether the approach is something that 
could be generalized to, for example, prospectus documents. The challenge is to 
assess how our current teaching and analysis of securities regulation would have to 
change if disclosure of information was no longer the default regulatory solution to 
emerging securities-related problems. In short, what would an expanded regulatory 
toolbox look like? 
 
 
CHALLENGES FOR THE REGULATION OF TRADING IN SECONDARY 
MARKETS 
 
In the classic economic paradigm, secondary trading markets such as the Toronto 
Stock Exchange exist to enhance the attractiveness of primary markets. The 
assumption is that investors would be reluctant to invest in the primary markets if 
there was not an opportunity to sell the investment to a third party whenever desired. 
The reality of the activities in secondary markets belies this rationale for their 
existence. Currently, the size of secondary markets far outstrips the value of primary 
financings. Yet, relatively little attention is paid to analysing the activity of trading in 
those markets, and those who engage in it, some of whom are market intermediaries 
and some of whom are not. 
 
 
Meanwhile, the topic of high frequency trading is a subject of global 
concern. Organizations such as the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions are currently developing policy positions about their role in secondary 
trading markets. High frequency trading refers to the use of sophisticated technology 
and algorithms to move in and out of positions in securities in fractions of a second. 
Here in Canada, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada recently 
issued the first phase of a study intended to provide policy recommendations for 
dealing with high frequency trading.32 The first phase identifies the extent to which 
this activity occurs in Canadian markets. The second phase will wrestle with 
questions pertaining to whether high frequency traders exacerbate volatility in the 
market and thereby create market instability (systemic risk). It will also examine the 
extent to which the practice manipulates markets or otherwise exacts an unfair 
advantage over retail investors.33  
 
 
32 Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada, “The HOT Study: Phases 1 and 2 of IIROC’s 
Study of High Frequency Trading Activity on Canadian Equity Marketplaces” (December 2012) online: 
<http://www.iiroc.ca/Documents/2012/c03dbb44-9032-4c6b-946e-6f2bd6cf4e23_en.pdf>.  
33 See e.g. Ken Little, High Frequency Trading Puts Stock Investors at Disadvantage, online: About 
<http://stocks.about.com/od/advancedtrading/a/051010highfrequency.htm >. 
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Increasingly, trading technology facilitates rapid price changes irrespective 
of any changes disclosed by the issuing company. This activity may make the 
underlying logic of the securities law disclosure framework less relevant. We need to 
begin a policy debate about the consequences of the drive to trading efficiency that 
could undermine the very integrity of the markets to the detriment of all investors. 
 
 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS FOR SECURITIES LAW BREACHES 
 
Discussions about the effectiveness of enforcement in the securities field are 
endemic in Canada. Investor advocates feel strongly that not enough attention is paid 
to enforcement in Canada, in comparison to the US. This is one of the major reasons 
for advocating a national system of securities regulation, as evidenced by various 
expert considerations of the provincial model of securities law in Canada.34 It is also 
true that the legal framework for enforcement is more familiar terrain for both the 
securities law curriculum and academic commentary in Canada.35 We analyse 
enforcement in the law school curriculum, but we may not sufficiently confront the 
role that enforcement plays in the achievement of policy goals. We also need to 
examine the way different enforcement arenas and remedies interact.  
 
 
With respect to civil remedies exercisable by investors, there is growing 
interest in their viability. All Canadian provinces now include in their statutes 
remedies for misrepresentations in the continuous disclosure documents required 
under securities law such as annual financial statements or material change reports. 
These provisions also grant remedies when responsible issuers fail to disclose 
material changes in a timely manner. Similar remedies have been available for 
decades with respect to misrepresentations in prospectus documents, but they were 
infrequently deployed by investors. What seems to be happening now is the 
development of a plaintiff-side bar in Canada that is willing to organize and manage 
classes of litigants. National Economic Research Associates Incorporated reports that 
since 2008 on average 12 cases start each year, with a record of 15 claims issued in 
2011.36 Further, there were 51 active cases in total as of the end of 2012.37 The 
academic literature compares and contrasts this landscape with that of the US, 
34 Wise Persons Committee, “Wise Persons' Committee Calls for Single Securities Regulator Built on 
Joint Federal-Provincial Model” (17 December 2003) WPC Press Release, online: < http://www.wise-
averties.ca/about_press_121703_en.html>; Robert D Chapman & Edward P Kerwin, Canada’s Expert 
Panel on Securities Regulation – Final Report (27 February 2009), online: McCarthy Tetrault  
<http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=4394>. 
35 Mary Condon, “Rethinking Enforcement and Litigation in Ontario Securities Regulation” (2006) 32 
Queens LJ 1; Christopher C. Nicholls "Civil Enforcement in Canadian Securities Law" (2009) 9:2 Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies 367; Poonam Puri "Securities Litigation and Enforcement: The Canadian 
Perspective" (2012) 37:3 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 967.  
36 Bradley A Heys & Mark L Berenblut, “Trends in Canadian Securities Class Actions: 2012 Update” (13 
February 2013) online: NERA Economic Consulting <www.nera.com>.  
37 Drew Hasselback, “Canadian securities class actions dipped in 2012” The Financial Post (14 February 
2013) online: <business.financialpost.com>.  
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usually pointing to express limitations on suits in Canada that do not exist in the US. 
But it should be noted that these statute-based civil remedies are available only 
against issuers and their “gatekeepers”. Private remedies against registrants (if they 
exist) are left to be developed by the common law in a piecemeal fashion. In other 
words, as I argued earlier with respect to the proliferation of financial services titles 
and products in Canada, the legal framework has not kept pace with the various ways 
in which investors interact with securities markets and financial services. The 
specific question raised by the growing involvement of different investors in the 
markets is whether we should promote the development of statutory remedies for 
investors in their dealings with registrants. 
 
 
With respect to enforcement of securities law norms by regulators, there is 
the possibility for both federal and provincial jurisdiction to be exercised as 
recognized by the SCC. An important question for regulators is in what 
circumstances the criminal law power should be used, as opposed to the exercise of 
regulatory authority by way of the application of sanctions following an 
administrative hearing. This issue should include analysis of the ability of different 
enforcement tools to change behaviour. Specifically, it is clear that much of 
Canada’s securities enforcement resources are spent on the problem of illegal 
distributions. These are situations where unsophisticated investors are sold securities 
in the absence of regulator-sanctioned disclosure, and which in many cases are 
fraudulent distributions. The Canadian Securities Administrators’ 2011 Enforcement 
Report38 shows the trend here. Between 2009 and 2011, illegal distributions were the 
largest category of concluded case.  
 
 
This focus on harm to individual investors shows that an investor-centric 
approach is embraced here. But do we have a basis for judging how much of 
Canada’s enforcement resources should be devoted to illegal distributions as 
compared to secondary market-related breaches? If there is symbolic or deterrent 
value in public enforcement activity, should it be deployed with respect to small 
numbers of harmed investors in fraud-type distributions or larger numbers of 
investors active in the secondary markets? In addressing this dilemma, some 
academic commentators focus on attempting to determine the cost of pursuing 
different categories of legal breaches.39 We have not, however, been able to measure 
the differential deterrent effects of one or another form of public enforcement action.  
 
 
Finally, the focus on illegal distributions has other consequences. A 
consistent theme of the Canadian Securities Administrators’ enforcement reports is 
38 Canadian Securities Administrators, “2011 Enforcement Report”, online: <http://www.securities-
administrators.ca/uploadedFiles/General/pdfs/CSA_2011_English.pdf?n=2239>. 
39 Howell Jackson & Mark Roe, “Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource Based Evidence” 
(2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207. 
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that the second and smaller category of legal breaches involves “misconduct” by 
registrants. Regulators and academics should analyse closely what this misconduct 
actually involves and the extent to which it should influence future policy-making 
with respect to registration requirements.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Canadian securities markets have been subject to both delegation up and delegation 
down in the allocation of responsibility for policy-making. The delegation up has 
given authority to the Group of Twenty to set domestic regulatory agendas. The 
delegation down has allocated responsibility to self-regulatory organizations for 
front-line regulation of financial services in Canada. The law school curriculum has 
not kept up with these developments. Nor has it taken sufficient account of market 
innovations in products and trading methodologies. Throughout this talk I argued 
that if we took a more investor-centric approach to the study of securities law, we 
would have to change the focus of what we teach and how we teach it. We would 
focus more on the delivery of financial intermediation services and the legal 
framework that should support it. In particular we would take a more sceptical 
approach to the value of disclosure as our core orienting principle and begin 
discussing a wider array of tools to accomplish regulatory goals. Taking a more 
investor-centric approach might also require us to ask hard questions about the 
architecture of our financial regulation itself and whether it continues to be “fit for 
purpose.” 
 
 
If taking an investor-oriented perspective requires us to study different 
things in a law school curriculum, it also requires lawyers to think beyond the private 
practice of securities law, which is largely issuer-focused. I think lawyers should 
further consider bringing skills of legal analysis and problem-solving to bear on a 
wider variety of concerns across the spectrum of modern financial markets 
regulation. An investor-centric perspective would be invaluable to the fulfilment of 
roles such as those of banking regulator, compliance officer in financial services 
firms, or plaintiff-side securities lawyer. I hope some of you in the audience will take 
up this challenge.  
 
 
Thank you for listening to these remarks. 
